The Ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is slated to take place in Geneva, Switzerland from 28 November to 16 December 2022. The ongoing controversy as to the origin of SARS CoV-2 virus at the epicenter of the COVID-19 global pandemic and growing biosecurity related challenges from the vast biotechnology global research and development enterprise touches upon a key shortcoming in the BWC treaty enforcement, which is the lack of a verification regime for compliance by the signatory nations. BWC is the first multilateral United Nations disarmament treaty that prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of biological toxin weapons, entered into force in 1975. 184 states are signatories to the global treaty.
The forthcoming Ninth Review of the BWC presents an opportunity to the global community, now in the midst of the COVID-19 global pandemic, reinvigorate the treaty verification mechanism centered around Biosecurity framework for building confidence-building measures through transparency and trust aimed at reducing the risk of biological catastrophes, whether natural or synthetic, and to broaden information sharing mechanisms should a serious threat to global biosecurity arise.
Unfortunately, the current BWC does not provide a policy framework around biosecurity to forge a verification mechanism more in tune with the rapid advances in biotechnology and large number of technology stakeholders from the 184 signatory nations. With the raging COVID-19 pandemic, biosecurity offers a unique technology-policy linked framework to further multilateral reviews and initiate a policy forum for a more systematic consideration of biosecurity incorporating more mature biosecurity-centered policy measures in some partner nations. For example, the evolving US biosecurity policy landscape could provide the necessary impetus for such a global forum at the BWC.
The current US biosecurity policy landscape predominantly focuses on pathogens and toxins, having limited focus on rapidly changing biotechnologies with potential to positively contribute to biodefense capabilities or introduce unknown and/or unacceptable security risk. Based on our analyses, we present actions for implementing biosecurity and biodefense policy in the United States that intends to harness the benefits of science and technology while also minimizing potential risks. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30942632/
The biosecurity policy analysis described in our study offers a blueprint
for developing a broader BWC international framework around the confidence building measures (CBM). BWC signatory nations have no uniform BWC-related legislation and have a record of inconsistent implementation further diminishing the efficacy of treaty implementation. A key question for the ongoing BWC review participant-nations is whether a new measure around biosecurity offers a more consistent and verifiable measure of evolution of biological safety and related practices and a format for sharing information and reporting progress. Biosecurity as a metric for CBM also offers a more attractive alternative to address the glaring gaps in the COVID-19 global pandemic response.
With sufficient and enduring emphasis by BWC signatory-nations, biosecurity may emerge as the key metric as alternatives to building CBM and develop and implement BWC-related legislation aimed at transparency, information sharing and coordination of global response, including in cases of a pandemic.